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The sleeper-hit Memento (2000), directed by Christopher Nolan, is a brilliantly structured
contemporary film noir that is focused through the main character, Leonard Shelby (Guy
Pearce), who has a debilitating memory condition. Hit on the head during a home
invasion – ‘the incident’ – Leonard can remember his life as an insurance claimsinvestigator before the incident, but he cannot form new long-term memories. Thus,
every fifteen minutes or so, he partially becomes a tabula rasa afresh. This condition is
explained to the audience through Leonard’s recounting the story of Sammy Jankis
(Stephen Tobolowsky) to explain his condition to others and himself. (Sammy was the
subject of one of Leonard’s pre-incident investigations who apparently suffered from a
similar condition.) One of the main narrative drives of the movie is Leonard’s quest to
find ‘John G’ – the mysterious second assailant in the incident, who supposedly raped
and murdered Leonard’s wife – and exact his revenge by killing him.
Nolan’s stroke of genius, and the initially most striking feature of the film, is its
structure, which places the audience in much the same epistemic position as Leonard, and
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contributes strongly to our identification and empathy with him. The majority of the film
consists of scenes of about five minutes that are presented in reverse chronological order.
Thus, with each scene we are thrown in medias res, and only at the end of the next scene
does the action get put into context, as we come to understand the events that led up to it.
Thus, unlike in most films, we are constantly witnessing events without knowing what
has happened earlier. Of course, this means that, unlike Leonard, we soon know some
things that will happen later than the fictional events now unfolding.
Memento’s structure is more complicated even than this, though. The film
contains 44 scenes, and covers a period of approximately 36 hours in the fictional world.
(When I talk about the fictional world represented in the film, I will talk about ‘fictional
time’ and the ‘fictional world’. When I am talking about the film itself, the representation
or artwork, I will talk about ‘film time’ and ‘the film’. Thus, in Memento, though
breakfast precedes lunch in the fictional world, lunch might well precede breakfast in the
film. This distinction has various labels in narrative theory. Rough synonyms for what I
call ‘the fictional world’ include ‘story’, ‘histoire’, and ‘fabula’, while what I call ‘the
film’ also goes by the general names of ‘discourse’, ‘récit’, and ‘syuzhet’.) 21 of the
scenes are relatively short (averaging under one minute) and shot in black and white.
Their chronological order is the same in the film and the fictional world; that is, anything
you see in a black and white scene fictionally occurs after anything else you have already
seen in a black and white scene in the film (ignoring flashbacks). These scenes cover the
first, much shorter period of fictional time covered in the movie (perhaps an hour or two).
21 of the scenes are longer and shot in color. The fictional events they represent all occur
after those of the black and white scenes, yet in the film they occur in reverse fictional
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chronological order, and are interleaved with the black and white scenes. Labeling the
black and white scenes 1-21, and the color scenes B-V, the fictional chronology can be
represented as follows (Klein 2001a):
1, 2, 3, …, 19, 20, 21, 22/A, B, C, D, …, T, U, V, Ω,
while the order of scenes in the movie runs as follows:
Ω, 1, V, 2, U, 3, T, …, 20, C, 21, B, 22/A.
There are two scenes in the above sequence that I have not yet discussed. 22/A is
a pivotal scene, right in the middle of the fictional events, as divided into scenes (though
quite early in the fictional time covered by the movie, since the black and white scenes
are so short), and at the very end of the film. As its name suggests, scene 22/A begins in
black and white and unobtrusively fades into color partway through, as one of Leonard’s
Polaroids develops (1:39:36-42). (I make a few references to the film by time elapsed in
hours:minutes:seconds.) Scene Ω is another unique scene, the last fictional event
represented, but the first scene in the movie – the credit sequence, in fact, which alerts the
viewer to the ‘backwards’ structure of the movie. It is shot in color, and, unlike any other
scene in the movie, it is actually shot in reverse; that is, fictional time is represented as
flowing backwards during this first (film time) and last (fictional time) scene. Blood
oozes up walls, a pair of eye-glasses begins to tremble before flying up onto someone’s
face, and a bullet flies back into a gun, pulling the victim’s brains back into his skull.

MEMENTO AS NEO-NOIR
This structure, together with the lighting of the black and white scenes, Leonard’s
intermittent voice-over, the sleazy locations, sordid events, and so on, places Memento
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firmly within the category of ‘neo-noir’ – films that draw heavily on elements of the
classic film noirs of the 1940s and ’50s. One classic film noir structure is the extended
flashback: the film begins with the protagonist in some sorry state, followed by a
flashback that comprises the rest of the film, showing how this came to pass. Through the
protagonist’s memories, the audience is introduced to characters who turn out to be quite
other than they seemed at first, and the perpetrator of a central crime (legal, moral,
amorous, or otherwise; often all three) is revealed (e.g., Detour, Double Indemnity, and
Murder, My Sweet). Literally every second scene of Memento is a microcosm of this
classic structure. But there are idiosyncrasies in how the structure is fleshed out in
Memento that amount to a reconsideration of some recurrent film noir themes.
First, the protagonist of a classic film noir has typically learned something
through his travails, even if it has cost him his peace of mind, livelihood, or even life. By
contrast, it is not clear that Leonard is capable of learning anything of the sort. This is in
part due to his condition, but the constant parallels drawn between Leonard’s condition
and the epistemic position we all inhabit perhaps imply a vision of our potential for
enlightenment even more pessimistic than that of traditional film noir.
Second, there is typically a central betrayal of the protagonist, or a series of such
betrayals. In Memento the protagonist is betrayed by himself, fooled into thinking that
Teddy (Joe Pantoliano) is John G. One might say this metaphorically of traditional noir
protagonists (betrayed by their hubris, for instance), but in Memento the self-betrayal is
more literal (though see the discussion of personal identity, below, regarding the
coherence of this claim). Together with the structure, which leads us to identify very
strongly with Leonard, this confuses our emotional responses to Leonard. On the one
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hand, we sympathize with him as the betrayed vulnerable protagonist; on the other, we
detest him as the betrayer. Thus there is an intensification of the usual ambiguity we feel
towards noir protagonists.
Third, Natalie (Carrie-Anne Moss) seems to be the film’s femme fatale, and most
first-time viewers see her as a cold, self-seeking, manipulative character. She initiates a
fight with Leonard by insulting his dead wife and manipulates him to escape a dangerous
situation. However, the structure of the film conceals that (i) she is in this situation only
because of Leonard’s actions, and knows it, (ii) that she initiates the fight only to
extricate herself from the situation, and (iii) that she helps Leonard much more than is
necessary to achieve her ends. In light of the fact that she has just learnt that her partner is
dead and that Leonard is somehow responsible for this, she is remarkably generous in
offering him a place to spend the night. (Though this place is her bed, it seems unlikely
that Leonard and Natalie had sex, contrary to most people’s initial inferences.)

IS MEMENTO A FILM?
One of the reasons for Memento’s success is the challenge of simply figuring out what
goes on in the film. Audiences went straight from theatre to coffeehouse to try to answer
the film’s main narrative questions: Who is John G? Is Leonard Sammy Jankis? What is
the true nature of his memory condition? Part of the difficulty of answering these
questions is due to the film’s confusing structure, but part of it is due to the underdetermination of the fictional facts by the movie. That is, the movie is ultimately
ambiguous about some of these central questions, such as whether the tale Leonard
recounts of Sammy Jankis is really about himself. Equally coherent and compelling
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interpretations provide mutually exclusive answers to these questions. (See Klein 2001a,
2001b, Zhu 2001, Mottram 2002: 21-77, and Duncker 2003 for some consideration of
different interpretations.)
How coherent and compelling an interpretation is, though, depends on how much
of the relevant data it accounts for. Like many recent movies, part of Memento’s release
publicity was a website (http://www.otnemem.com/index.html). The website is even
more enigmatic than the movie, since, of course, one of its prime functions was to
intrigue people enough to buy a ticket to the film. But though the website was thus
similar in function to the theatrical trailer, it was very different in one notable respect: the
website provides a relatively large amount of new information about the fictional world –
information that is not imparted, even implicitly, by the film. The main addition is the
fictional truth that Leonard spent some time in a mental institution, beginning apparently
nine months after the incident, and then escaped from it. There are fictional newspaper
clippings, parts of psychological reports on Leonard from the institution, excerpts from
Leonard’s journal, and so on, all attesting to this additional piece of fictional information.
There is almost nothing in the movie itself to suggest that Leonard has spent time
in a mental institution. There is a highly suggestive cut in one scene that shows Sammy
Jankis in a mental institution. For a split second, Sammy is replaced by Leonard in the
shot (1:29:56). But throughout the movie, parallels are being drawn between Sammy and
Leonard. Without the additional materials from the website, an interpretation that claimed
Leonard spent time in a mental institution following the incident – let alone that that time
began long after the incident – would be unjustifiable. There is simply no information
given in the movie about this fictional period. The action takes place over three days and
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two nights. Flashbacks and recollections of various characters give us information about
two other periods: (1) the period before the incident, when Leonard was an insuranceclaims investigator following Sammy’s case, and (2) the night of the incident itself.
(There are additionally a few short ‘projective’ shots, which represent scenes Leonard is
only imagining or entertaining.) The website gives information almost exclusively about
the period between the incident and the ‘present’ of the movie, and, if taken into account,
makes much more plausible the interpretation that there is in fact no Sammy Jankis as
Leonard describes him, that Sammy’s story is really a way Leonard (or some
psychological part of him) has devised of representing parts of his past he cannot fully
acknowledge. This has further ramifications for any interpretation of the film.
The question, then, is whether the information on the website has status equal to
that of the contents of the film, and must thus be taken into account in any interpretation
of Memento. Of course, the website might reasonably be taken into account even if it is
not part of the artwork. Understanding any work of art requires more than simple sensory
experience of it. However, two things should be noted: First, the website is unlike other
background material (general knowledge of cinematic conventions, reviews of the film,
even the short story on which the film is partly based, and so on) in that it seems to
contribute to the content of the fictional world of the film. Second, whatever one’s views
on the relevance of background materials to the interpretation of a work, if the website is
part of the work itself it should surely play a more central role than if it were just
background material.
There are good reasons to consider the possibility that the website is part of the
artwork we call Memento. First, the creation of the website was overseen by the director,
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who, for instance, seems to have removed some references to the date of Leonard’s
wife’s death from earlier versions (Andy Klein, quoted in Zhu 2001). Second, in some
interviews Nolan endorses the view that Memento is an extended artwork comprising
website and film (Mottram 2002: 73). Third, not only is the website material included on
all DVDs of the film, but the special edition DVD comes packaged as Leonard’s file from
the mental institution, and a psychological-test conceit governs its design. Even to get the
movie to play, you need to select the right word from a selection of fifty formatted to
look like a psychological test.
But there are also good reasons to reject the website material as part of Memento.
For one thing, Nolan is inconsistent in how he regards the material. Sometimes he
endorses it, but at other times – including an interview included on the DVDs – he says
that you can figure out what happens in the fictional world simply by watching the movie
closely (Mottram 2002: 26). More importantly, though, there are reasons to think that an
artist is not in sole control of the kind of thing she produces, especially in a popular mass
artform such as narrative film. Theories of art interpretation tend to fall along a spectrum
according to the extent to which they take the artist’s intentions about the meaning of a
work into account. Most fall somewhere in between the extremes of simply equating the
meaning of the work with whatever the artist intended and taking no account of the artist
at all. However, when it comes to determining what kind of thing the artwork is (painting,
symphony, etc.) most theorists, if not silent, are ‘actual intentionalists,’ claiming that the
artist gets to determine what counts as the artwork, whatever their views on the
implications of artists’ intentions for interpretation (e.g., Levinson 1992: 232-3).
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In most cases such a theory works well. After all, you do not get many painters
insisting that the canvas in front of them is, literally, a string quartet. But it is the
extraordinary cases that test a theory. If all educated audiences read some novel as a work
of dark nihilism, for instance, it is difficult to defend a theory of interpretation according
to which the novel’s central theme is that love conquers all, simply because the author
intended that reading. Cases like this suggest that an author’s intentions only go so far in
determining a work’s meaning. Similarly, if all suitably backgrounded audiences take
Memento to be simply a film, that is some evidence that it is, and that the kind of work an
artist creates has to do with more than just the artist’s intentions.
A theory that developed this idea might appeal to the social, public nature of art.
One of the reasons that people work within a well-defined artistic category, such as
painting, is that, due to a tradition of people producing objects of the same sort, and
appreciating objects of that sort, there is a shared sense of what doing something with
paint on a canvas amounts to. Such conventions often both provide an artistic language
and restrict what an artist can meaningfully do (Davies 2003). In the twentieth-century,
avant-garde artists expanded the boundaries of art in such a way that, notoriously, now
anything can be art. Philosophers have tended to focus on avant-garde and ‘high’ art, but
it may be that the popular mass arts, such as film, are more ‘conventional’ in the sense
that what is possible in an art gallery may not be possible in a cinema. Suppose, for
instance, that Nolan insisted in a series of interviews that Memento was not just a film,
but a film and a small pile of wood shavings in his garden shed. Though it would
certainly be possible for an avant-garde artist to produce such a work for the artworld, it
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is not obvious that Nolan can do so, given the overwhelming evidence that he is working
within the tradition of popular narrative film.

PHILOSOPHICAL THEMES IN MEMENTO
Whatever the ontological nature of Memento, it does not contribute to any philosophical
debate about the ontology of art, except by being an interesting example – part of the
domain of inquiry. There has been some debate about whether, how, and the extent to
which films can ‘do philosophy’ (e.g., Livingston 2006, Wartenberg 2006, and Smith
2006). I tend to be sympathetic to Livingston’s and Wartenberg’s moderate views that
some films can be insightful and useful pedagogical and heuristic illustrations of
philosophical issues and theories. Memento is remarkable for the number of philosophical
issues it raises. Unfortunately there is only space here to indicate some of those issues
briefly. (I give few references in the text below; I refer the reader instead to the list of
further reading at the end of this chapter.)

Mind and Memory
Something that is very important to Leonard about Sammy Jankis’s condition is that it is
‘mental’ rather than ‘physical’. Assuming, as is the majority view in contemporary
philosophy of mind, that one’s mind is, in some sense, simply one’s brain – a physical
organ – does this distinction amount to anything? That it does can be illustrated by the
fact that exactly how to spell out the sense in which the mind is the brain is still a matter
of much debate. This is not the place to recapitulate that debate. One way to think about it
in connection with the distinction Leonard draws, however, is to think about the way the
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mind represents things. For instance, when you think about your mother, something in
your head represents your mother in some way, just as her name written in your address
book represents her in some way. Moreover, the representational system of your mind
must be highly systematic, so that you can use your ‘mother-representation’ in thinking
about different aspects of your mother, other people’s mothers, and so on. How physical
things can ultimately ‘be about’ other things is one of the deepest mysteries about the
mind, the problem of ‘intentionality.’ Taking intentionality for granted, though, we can
consider two kinds of ways a mind or brain can malfunction. There are brute physical
defects, such as those caused by massive physical trauma, like being hit in the head with
a sap. Such an injury might simply stop your mind from functioning at all. But it might
stop only part of your mind from functioning, such as your ability to read, to recognize
familiar objects, or to form new long-term memories, particularly if such functions are
localized in one part of the brain. Another kind of problem involves the representational
content of your mind. For instance, some psychologists believe that in the face of horrific
events, people sometimes involuntarily repress their memories of those events. The
mechanism responsible for such repression would have to be sensitive to the
representational content of whatever encodes the memory in the brain in order to repress
only the memories of the horrific event.
This distinction allows us to think more closely about two aspects of Memento.
First, it makes sense of the mental/physical distinction that Leonard and the insurance
company he represents appeal to in considering Sammy’s case. Second, it gives us one
way to explain apparent inconsistencies in certain interpretations of the film. It seems that
the explanation Teddy gives of Leonard’s situation in the final scene – namely, that the
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story Leonard tells about Sammy is really about himself – cannot be correct, since if it
were, Leonard would remember that his wife was diabetic, as she would have been
diabetic prior to the incident. This assumes, though, that Leonard’s condition is as he
describes it throughout the film – a ‘physical’ condition brought about by being hit on the
head during the incident. If, rather, Leonard is repressing memories, his memories from
before the incident may not be as reliable as he claims. This interpretation makes sense of
some puzzling aspects of the film, such as the fact that none of Leonard’s memories of
his wife are happy. He even says twice that his wife called him ‘Lenny’ and he hated it
(0:17:43-52, 1:11:37-46). But it raises further questions, such as what his psychological
condition was between the incident and his killing his wife, and how this could cohere
with the repression of his memories of killing her.
Whatever the true nature of Leonard’s condition, it is thankfully one not many of
us suffer from, though the relief at this fact reminds us how much we rely on memory to
make it through our everyday lives. On the other hand, Leonard claims that his ‘system’
allows him to deal with his condition, often implying it is superior to ordinary memory, at
least for certain purposes, such as his detective work. This is due in part to the alleged
unreliability of memory, as opposed to other forms of evidence, such as Leonard’s
photographs and notes. There has been surprisingly little work on the epistemology of
memory. Philosophers have been more concerned with the formation of beliefs than their
maintenance (Senor 2005). Recently, however, it has been argued that the elements of a
system like Leonard’s (photographs, notes, etc.) qualify as parts of his memory –
provided the system meets certain criteria, such as being reliable, accessible, and
typically invoked (Clark and Chalmers 1998, Clark forthcoming). According to this
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‘extended mind’ hypothesis, one’s mind need not end at the boundary of one’s brain. A
big question in Leonard’s case, of course, is how reliable his system is. But the fact that
someone’s biological memory is malfunctioning does not disqualify it from being part of
his mind. Memory impairment is a psychological condition, after all. So if the extended
mind hypothesis is correct, it might be that Leonard’s system is part of his mind after all,
though it may be as faulty as his biological memory.

Freedom, Personal Identity, and Moral Responsibility
Teddy’s death in the opening scene is one of the horrific results of the fallibility of
Leonard’s system. It seems clear that even if John G, the second assailant, exists, Teddy
is not him. Yet we come to realize that Leonard kills Teddy thinking Teddy is John G.
This raises a number of moral issues. Some revolve around the nexus of justice,
punishment, and revenge: What punishment is appropriate for rape and murder? Is it ever
acceptable to seek ‘vengeance’ for a crime outside the law? Others revolve around
Teddy’s manipulation of Leonard: What is the relative culpability of someone who
induces others to commit crimes? Can justice be served unintentionally? Whatever the
answers to these questions, it is plausible that Teddy does not deserve to die at Leonard’s
hands. Does the fact that Leonard’s actions are largely due to his false belief that Teddy
raped and murdered his wife affect the extent to which Leonard is morally responsible for
his actions?
Many people believe that you can only be responsible for actions performed of
your own free will. If someone commits homicide robotically, as the result of hypnotic
suggestion, for instance, we do not hold that person responsible. The nature of free will,
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though, is one of the most difficult and perennial of philosophical problems. Many
philosophers take some sort of rationality to be a necessary criterion of free will. That is,
if your actions are not counterfactually dependent on reasons, in other words if you
would have done what you did no matter what other reasons presented themselves to you,
you are not free. Leonard’s condition is cause for concern with respect to this criterion,
since it prevents him from developing a coherent picture of the world that is sensitive to
his experiences. If you first encountered someone with Leonard’s condition you might
consider him irrational, since he might, for instance, innocently offer you a cup of coffee
fifteen minutes after you had told him you are fatally allergic to it. Learning about his
condition would help explain this irrationality, but it would not make such behavior
rational.
Another recurring theme in the discussion of free will is the relation between
action and desire. Some philosophers hold that you act freely if your actions follow from
your desires (e.g., Hume 1748/1999). Others argue that the relationship is more complex,
for instance, that you act freely only if you act on a desire that you endorse at some
fundamental level (Frankfurt 1971). Whatever the details, it seems questionable that
Leonard meets any acceptable version of such a criterion. In a sense he is acting on his
desire to kill Teddy – no one is holding a gun to Leonard’s head – but in another sense he
has been forced, or at least dishonestly led, to perform this action. For he has been tricked
into thinking that Teddy raped and murdered his wife, and we might think that that is a
mitigating circumstance, or at the very least that the person who so tricked him is
partially morally responsible for Teddy’s death.
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Of course, one of the most chilling things about the dénouement of Memento is
that we discover it is Leonard who has tricked himself into believing that Teddy is John
G, knowing full well that he is not. This points to, among other things, the irony that it is
precisely the condition that his system is supposed to compensate for that renders it
fatally unreliable in the end. (You might wonder whether this is the right characterization
of what is going on here, since Leonard obviously wants to kill Teddy, or he would not
knowingly set himself up to kill him. But of course, Leonard could just as easily (and
perhaps more securely) write himself a note initiating a new quest to kill Teddy for what
he really has done, or simply shoot him then and there, rather than setting himself up to
kill Teddy as John G.)
The fact that Leonard can be tricked by an earlier ‘temporal part’ of himself raises
a further question about the requirements for moral responsibility. Suppose Leonard had
an identical twin brother. It would be grossly unjust to punish Leonard’s twin for killing
Teddy, since he is a different person from Leonard. The fact that they look the same is
irrelevant. Given the nature of Leonard’s condition, however, you might wonder whether
the person we call ‘Leonard’ the day after Teddy’s death is any more Teddy’s killer than
Leonard’s hypothetical twin. To settle this question we need a theory of ‘personal
identity’ – a theory of what makes one person (say, someone you point to on the street)
the very same individual as ‘another’ person (say, a child in a photograph).
The most popular kind of theory of personal identity is that the numerical identity,
or sameness, of a person across time is a matter of a particular kind of psychological
continuity. That is, the person you are right now is the same person as, for instance, the
person in your high school yearbook if, and only if, your current mental state – your
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emotions, beliefs, desires, and so on – depends in a certain way on the mental state of the
person in the yearbook. How to spell out the exact nature of the connection is (again!) a
matter of considerable debate. But this is enough to see what a strange position Leonard
is in. Every time his memory ‘refreshes,’ he becomes the psychological continuant not of
the person inhabiting his body ten minutes ago, but of Leonard Shelby the insurance
investigator, as he was on the night of the incident. Thus Leonard’s psychology is
continually branching. The person ‘he’ is every fifteen minutes is continuous with the
person he was before the incident, but none of these continuants is continuous with any
other!
There is some continuity between each post-incident ‘Leonard’, however. For one
thing, his pre-incident memories are somehow preserved continuously through the serial
wipings of his short-term memory. For another, if he has been very active, and his
memory is wiped, he still feels tired. Also, his emotional states seem continuous. As he
says, ‘you feel angry, you don’t know why; you feel guilty, you have no idea why…’.
One thing Memento provides us with, then, is an interesting test case for theories of
personal identity. Does Leonard have the right sort of psychological continuity
throughout his post-incident life to be considered a single person, in the sense that he can
be held morally responsible for ‘his’ earlier actions, such as killing Teddy?
As with many of the issues raised by Memento, it pays to reflect on the extent to
which Leonard’s situation is just our own, taken to the extreme. If you commit to
achieving some goal, such as gaining a degree, you might feel obligated by that
commitment to trying to reach that goal, even if you can’t quite reconstruct the reasoning
that led you to embrace the goal in the first place. But why should you? Why not rather
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see the goal as something imposed by someone you no longer are? As people go through
their lives they can change their goals in quite radical ways, and they do not feel bound
by their earlier desires. Leonard goes through this process at a greatly accelerated rate,
thus leading us to question whether we might be as psychologically fragmented as he is,
albeit on a larger scale.

CONCLUSIONS
Memento is a fascinating film on many levels. It is a compelling example of a puzzle film
in the neo-noir tradition. The question of how we ought to solve its narrative puzzles
raises questions about the ontology and interpretation of popular cinema, and
philosophical questions about the nature of the mind, moral responsibility, freedom, and
persons. Here, I have only been able to make explicit some of the questions the film
raises; answering them will require the continuation of philosophical debate.

17

REFERENCES
Clark, A. (forthcoming) “Memento’s Revenge: Objections and Replies to the Extended
Mind,” in R. Menary (ed.) Cognitive Integration: Attacking the Bounds of
Cognition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Clark, A and D. Chalmers (1998) “The Extended Mind,” Analysis 58, 7-19.
Davies, D. (2003) “Medium,” in J. Levinson (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 181-91.
Duncker, J. (2004) “Memento,” <http://www.christophernolan.net/memento.php>.
Frankfurt, H. (1971) “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of
Philosophy 68, 5-20.
Hume, D. (1748/1999) “Of Liberty and Necessity,” section 8 of An Enquiry concerning
Human Understanding, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 148-64.
Klein, A. (2001a) “Everything You Wanted to Know about ‘Memento’,”
<http://dir.salon.com/ent/movies/feature/2001/06/28/memento_analysis/index.htm
l>.
Klein, A. (2001b) “Everything You Wanted to Know about ‘Memento’,”
<http://dir.salon.com/ent/letters/2001/07/04/memento/index.html>. (Klein’s
responses to correspondence about his 2001a.)
Levinson, J. (1992) “Intention and Interpretation: A Last Look,” in G. Iseminger (ed.)
Intention and Interpretation, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 221-56.
Livingston, P. (2006) “Theses on Cinema as Philosophy,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism, 64, 11-18.
Mottram, J. (2002) The Making of Memento. London: Faber and Faber.

18

Senor, T. D. (2005) “Epistemological Problems of Memory,” in E. N. Zalta (ed.) The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/memory-episprob/>.
Smith, M. (2006) “Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism, 64, 33-42.
Wartenberg, T. (2006) “Beyond Mere Illustration: How Films Can Be Philosophy,”
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 64, 19-32.
Zhu, D. (2001) “Memento FAQ,” <http://www.designpattern.org/mementofaq.htm>.

FURTHER READING
General
Kania, A. (ed.) (forthcoming) Philosophers on Memento. London and New York:
Routledge. (A collection of essays exploring the philosophical aspects of
Memento, including issues of memory, epistemology, and emotions; film noir,
ontology, and narrative theory; and personal identity, moral responsibility, and the
meaning of life.)
Nolan, J. (2001) “Memento Mori,” reprinted in J. Mottram (2002) The Making of
Memento. London: Faber and Faber, 183-95. Available online at
<http://www.esquire.com/fiction/fiction/ESQ0301-MAR_FICTION> (accessed 4
July, 2007). (Director Christopher Nolan’s brother, Jonathan, came up with the
original idea for the film. Christopher wrote the film, while Jonathan wrote this
quite different short story. It was first published in Esquire, 135, 186-91.)

19

Film noir, narrative, and interpretation
Currie, G. (1995) “Travels in Narrative Time,” chapter 7 of Image and Mind, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 198-222. (A discussion of the kinds of temporal
properties film is capable of representing.)
Silver, A. and J. Ursini (eds) (1996) Film Noir Reader. New York: Limelight Editions. (A
collection of classic essays on film noir.)
Livingston, P. (2005) Art and Intention. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Contains an
argument that an artist’s intentions about the kind of work she is creating are
inextricably bound up with her intentions for its meaning [pp. 148-65].)
Mind and Memory
Rey, G. (1997) Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach.
Malden, MA: Blackwell. (A clear and detailed introduction to contemporary
philosophy of mind, including discussion of intentionality and a defense of the
‘Computational/Representational Theory of Thought’.)
Sacks, O. (1985) The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat, and Other Clinical Tales.
New York: Summit. (An accessible collection of essays by a neurologist about
people with bizarre psychological problems, including two with a problem very
like Leonard’s [chapters 2 and 12].)
Hoerl, C. and T. McCormack (eds) Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and
Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (A collection of philosophical and
psychological essays about time and memory – their representation, experience,
epistemology, and metaphysics.)

20

Freedom, Personal Identity, and Moral Responsibility
Kane, R. (ed.) (2004) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. (An excellent collection of overview articles on a range of issues relevant
to the problem of free will, including its relation to moral responsibility.)
Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Contains the classic
contemporary discussion of personal identity and its relation to rationality,
morality, and our sense of ourselves.)
Smith, B. (2007) “John Locke, Personal Identity, and Memento” in M. T. Conrad (ed.)
The Philosophy of Neo-Noir, Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky,
35-46. (A nice consideration of how Leonard fares with respect to personal
identity according to the theories of Locke and Parfit, and the implications for
ourselves.)

21

